Lossy trapdoor functions (LTFs), introduced by Peiker and Waters in STOC'08, are functions that may be working in another injective mode or a lossy mode. Given such a function key, it is impossible to distinguish an injective key from a lossy key for any (probabilistic) polynomial-time adversary. This paper studies lossy trapdoor functions with tight security. First, we give a formal definition for tightly secure LTFs. Loosely speaking, a collection of LTFs is tightly secure if the advantage to distinguish a tuple of injective keys from a tuple of lossy keys does not degrade in the number of function keys. Then, we show that tightly secure LTFs can be used to construct public-key encryption schemes with tight CPA security in a multiuser, multichallenge setting, and with tight CCA security in a multiuser, one-challenge setting. Finally, we present a construction of tightly secure LTFs from the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Introduction
In STOC'08, Peikert and Waters [1] introduced the notion of lossy trapdoor functions (LTFs), which have been proven to be a powerful primitive in cryptography. Specifically, LTFs imply many cryptographic primitives, such as (injective) trapdoor functions, collision-resistant hash functions, oblivious transfer, correlated-product trapdoor functions [2] , and adaptive trapdoor functions [3] and have many "higher level" applications, such as leakage-resilient chosenciphertext secure cryptosystems [4] [5] [6] and deterministic public-key encryption [7] .
Informally, an LTF is a function that can work in one of two computationally indistinguishable modes: injective mode and lossy mode. In the injective mode, each function is invertible via a trapdoor. In the lossy mode, each function statistically loses information about its input. Thus, in the security proof (e.g., PKE scheme), the change that a function works in the lossy mode from the injective mode has only a negligible effect on the adversary's advantage. In addition, once all functions work in the lossy mode, a ciphertext contains nearly no information any more about the encrypted message. Such property can be used to achieve CPA security. LTFs parameterized with a tag are useful in the context of CCA-secure PKE schemes. One such tag-based LTFs are allbut-one lossy trapdoor functions (ABO-LTFs), also proposed in [1] . In ABO-LTFs, all of the tags are injective, except for one tag which is lossy. The lossy tag and the injective tag are (computationally) indistinguishable. There are also many variants of lossy trapdoor functions that are used in diverse scenarios, such as updatable lossy trapdoor functions [4, 5, 8] , chameleon ABO-LTFs [9] , evasive all-but-many LTFs [10] and all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions [11] .
Security Proofs by Reductions. Many cryptographic primitives, including lossy trapdoor functions, are designed around computational hardness assumptions (e.g., factoring an integer that is a product of two large primes). The approach to prove security often uses the security reduction technique which aims to convert any efficient algorithm (also called adversary) A that breaks the primitive with probability that the running times of algorithms A and B are roughly the same. If we consider the explicit relations between the success probabilities, the security reductions often suffer from a nontrivial multiplicative reduction loss such that only A ≤ ⋅ B can be guaranteed. A tight security reduction also means that the reduction loss is a (small) constant.
Design of cryptographic primitives with tight security reduction is an important problem since loose reductions imply security loss and large keys are needed to achieve a satisfactory level of security. However, many cryptographic primitives often suffer from loose security reduction, especially in a multiuser (or multichallenge) setting. Taking lossy trapdoor functions as an example, standard security notion for LTFs only considers one-user setting; i.e., the advantage of an adversary is defined to distinguish just one injective key from one lossy key. For multiple users, there will be many LTF keys. However, a generic hybrid security proof usually suffers from a reduction loss = , where is the number of users. The issue of loose reduction may result in a significantly practical consequence. As an example, consider a realistic setting that there are 2 10 users. According to the above discussion, the security level in the multiuser case reduces 2 10 times than that in the one-user setting. In other words, a secure lossy trapdoor functions may not be secure again in the multiuser setting. LTFs have been used to build many high level cryptographic primitives, e.g., PKE, and the latter usually work in a multiuser setting. Though there are many constructions of lossy trapdoor functions [1, 12, 13] , to the best of our knowledge, however, there is no study on lossy trapdoor functions in the multiuser setting.
Our Contribution.
In this paper, we initially study lossy trapdoor functions in a multiuser setting and formalize the notion of tightly secure lossy trapdoor functions. A collection of tightly secure LTFs is still a collection of LTFs, except that, in a multiuser setting, the security reduction does not degrade in the number of users. This new notion seems to enhance the security of standard LTFs, but does not change the functionality of LTFs. We show that tightly secure LTFs can be used to construct tightly secure public-key encryption (PKE) against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) in the multiuser, multichallenge setting (multichallenge means that each user's public key may be used to encrypt many challenge messages).
We naturally extend tight security from LTFs to ABOLTFs and propose the notion of tightly secure ABO-LTFs. We show that a collection of tightly secure LTFs with a suitable collection of tightly secure ABO-LTFs can be used to construct tightly secure PKE against adaptive chosenciphertext attacks (CCA) in multiuser, one-ciphertext setting. In this application, it requires an additional cryptographic primitive, called strong one-time signature, to be tightly secure. We show that the discrete-log-based strong one-time signature scheme proposed in [14] is tightly secure.
Under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, we construct a collection of tightly secure LTFs, as well as a collection of tightly secure ABO-LTFs. The tight security of them mainly benefits from the property of random selfreducibility of the underlying assumption.
Related Work:
Tightly Secure PKE. Public-key encryption (PKE), as one of the most important cryptographic primitives, often suffers from a loose security reduction. Bellare et al. [15] showed that security of PKE in the simple oneuser, one-ciphertext setting implies security in the much more realistic multiuser, multiciphertext setting. However, the generic security reduction suffers from a reduction loss = ⋅ , where is the number of users and is the number of challenge ciphertexts.
The design of PKE schemes with tight security reduction in multiuser, multiciphertext setting is not easy. One obstacle, as pointed out by Hofheinz and Jager [16] , is that the simulator in the CCA security reduction needs to answer all of the adversary's decryption queries except its own single (many) challenge ciphertext(s). To resolve this dilemma, nearly all of known PKE schemes use either the so-called "proof of wellformedness" [17] or the so-called "all-but-one technique" [18] . Yet both approaches can only guarantee to simulate one or few challenge ciphertexts at a time. To simulate many challenge ciphertexts, a hybrid argument is required. As a result, the security reduction loss grows linearly with the number of challenge ciphertexts. Hofheinz and Jager [16] applied the Naor-Yung paradigm (two tightly IND-CPAsecure PKEs and one tightly secure polynomial-time SS-NIZK) to obtain a generic construction of CCA-secure PKE scheme with tightly security reduction. As an example, they constructed the first PKE scheme with tight CCA security from the DLIN assumption with the usage of pairings. Later, Gay et al. [19] proposed the first tightly CCA-secure pairing-free public-key encryption scheme based on DDH assumption. Recently, Wei et al. [20] presented an improved PKE scheme of [16] with more compact ciphertext size, and Gay et al. [21] presented an improved tightly CCA-secure pairing-free PKE scheme with small ciphertexts and small public keys. Tightly secure all-but-many LTFs (ABM-LTFs) can be used to construct tightly (selective-opening) CCAsecured PKE schemes. However, to date, there are very few candidates of ABM-LTFs with well-tightness [22] .
Preliminaries
2.1. Notations. If is a finite set then | | denotes its size and $ ← denotes the operation of picking an element uniformly at random from . For any ∈ N, we denote by [ ] the set {1, . . . , }. By 1 , we denote the security parameter. We use PPT for the abbreviation of " probabilistic polynomialtime". We denote by ← ( , . . .) the operation of running an algorithm with inputs ( , . . .) and letting be the output.
Complexity Assumptions.
In the following, let G(1 ) be a PPT algorithm that takes as input a security parameter 1 and outputs a description of group (G, , ), where G is a group of prime order and is a random generator of G. For an arbitrary 1 ∈ G, let log ( 1 ) denote the discrete logarithm Table 1 =
is random is random is random is random
Definition 1 (discrete logarithm assumption). Let ∈ G be a random generator of G and ℎ ∈ G be a random group element. The discrete logarithm (DL) assumption states that the following advantage:
is negligible in for every PPT algorithm A.
Definition 2 (decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption). Let ∈ G be a random generator of G and
The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption in group G states that the advantage
Random Self-Reducibility of DDH [15, Lemma 5.1] . The tight security reduction of our LTFs and ABO-LTFs mainly benefit from the self-reducibility property of the DDH problem. Namely, there exists a PPT algorithm R ddh that takes as input the group order , generator , ( , , ) ∈ G 3 , and a bit ∈ {0, 1} and outputs ( , , ) ∈ G 3 such that we have the following. See Table 1 . Randomness Extractor [23, Lemma 2.4] . Let , be two random variables such that ∈ {0, 1} and H ∞ ( | ) ≤ ℓ. Let H be a family of pairwise independent hash functions from {0, 1} to {0, 1} . If ≤ ℓ − 2 log(1/ ), then H is an average-case strong extractor; i.e., the distribution ( , ℎ, ℎ( )) is statisticallyclose to the distribution ( , ℎ, ), where ℎ and a message outputs a signature ; (3) OTS.Vrf on input a verification key V , a message , and a signature outputs either 0 or 1. The correctness guarantees that OTS.Vrf(V , , )= 1 holds with probability 1, if and only if = OTS.Sign( , ). Next, we define the security notion of strong existential unforgeability under a one-time chosen message attack in multiuser setting. It is defined through a game played between a challenger and a PPT adversary A. The challenger first generates independently pairs of keys (V , ) and gives all V to the adversary. For each signing key , the adversary can obtain at most one signature = OTS.Sign( , ) on a single message chosen by the adversary. Finally, the adversary outputs a pair ( , ) and is said to succeed if there exists ∈ [ ] such that OTS.Vrf(V , , ) = 1 and ( , ) ̸ = ( , ). We denote by Adv su-cma OTS,A ( , ) the adversary's success probability (advantage). A one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable if the adversary has negligible advantage. If the advantage is independent of the number of users, the signature scheme is said to be tightness.
By the random self-reducibility of the discrete logarithm problem, we can show the following one-time signature scheme proposed in [14, Fig.4 ] is tightly secure in multiuser setting, if the schemes share the same group parameters. Let (G, , ) be a finite group with prime order and a random generator . Let : {0, 1} * → Z be a collision-resistant hash function. The system parameter is = (G, , , ). The signature scheme is described as follows. Proof. Given a challenge discrete logarithm problem ℎ * = * , our goal is to construct an algorithm B that breaks the discrete-log problem by taking the adversary algorithm A as a subroutine.
Let us denote by (V 1 , 2 ), . . . , (V , ) the key pairs and let ( , ) be the signature queried by A on message under signing key . Suppose that A finally outputs a valid (forged) signature ( , ) on message under the verification key V . By the collision-resistance of hash function , it is clear that ( , ) ̸ = ( , ). Otherwise, = . We first assume that ̸ = . Now, B simulates the game as follows. For each ∈ [ ], it randomly chooses , , , ∈ Z and implicitly sets = (
, and ( ) = ℎ * ⋅ and sets V = (
. By the randomness of , , and , the verification key V has the same distribution as the real verification key.
For each signing query on message , B computes = + ⋅ + ( ( ) + ) ⋅ (mod ) and sets = ( , ). B returns the signature to A. This signature has the same distribution as the real signature. Finally, A generates a forged signature ( , ( , )) under the verification key V . The forged signature satisfies
So, we have
If = , we must have ̸ = . Similarly, we can construct another algorithm B to solve the discrete logarithm problem for the case ̸ = . For any case, the two algorithms B and B are independent of the adversary's point of view. So, we can randomly guess which algorithm we will use to break the discrete logarithm problem using A as the subroutine.
Let be the even that A forges a valid signature and let be the even that the collision of occurs. Denote by dl the probability that B solves the discrete logarithm problem as stated in Definition 1. Denote by cr the probability for any PPT adversary to find a collision of ; that is,
. By the aforementioned analysis, if the event does not occur, then B solves the discrete-log problem with probability at least
This shows that the above one-time signature is tightly secure in the multiuser setting.
Definitions for Tightly Secure LTFs and ABO-LTFs
In the following, unless described otherwise, all quantities are implicitly functions of a security parameter ∈ N. We first recall the standard notions of lossy trapdoor functions and all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions from [1] and then introduce their tight security.
Tightly Secure LTFs
Definition 3 (lossy trapdoor functions). A collection of ( , ℓ)-lossy trapdoor functions LTF consists of the following (PPT) algorithms:
(i) ltf ← LTF.Sys (1 ): this is the system parameter generation algorithm. It takes as input a security parameter and outputs the system parameters ltf .
(ii) ( ltf , ltf ) ← LTF.IGen( ltf ): this is the key generation algorithm. It takes as input the system parameter ltf and outputs an (injective) evaluation key ltf and an inversion key ltf .
LGen( ltf ): this is the lossy key generation algorithm. It takes as input the system parameter ltf and outputs an (lossy) evaluation key ltf and the special symbol ⊥ (indicating that this evaluation key does not have corresponding inversion key).
(iv) ← LTF.Eval( ltf , ): this is the function evaluation algorithm. It takes as input an evaluation key ltf and a preimage ∈ {0, 1} and outputs an image .
this is the inversion algorithm. It takes as input an inversion key ltf and an image and outputs a preimage ∈ {0, 1} .
We require that LTF has the following properties.
Correctness. For all possible ltf ← LTF.Sys(1 ), all ( ltf , ltf ) ← LTF.IGen( ltf ), and all ∈ {0, 1} , we have LTF.Inv( ltf , LTF.Eval( ltf , )) = .
Lossiness. For all possible ltf ← LTF.Sys(1 ) and all ltf ← LTF.
LGen( ltf ), we say that LTF is ℓ-lossy, if the image set LTF.Eval( ltf , Dom) is of size at most 2 −ℓ .
Indistinguishability. For all possible ltf ← LTF.Sys(1 ) and for any PPT adversary A, we require that A can not distinguish an injective key from a lossy key with nonnegligible advantage. Namely, the function
is negligible in , where ( 0 , 0 ) ← LTF.IGen( ltf ) and
LGen( ltf ).
Definition 4 (tightly secure LTFs). We say that a collection of LTFs is tightly secure if, for any PPT adversary A, the following indistinguishability advantage is negligible and independent of , the number of injective or lossy keys. LGen( ltf ) to obtain the -th lossy key fl ltf and returns it to the adversary. Clearly, the standard indistinguishability is just the case that = 1.
Tightly Secure ABO-LTFs.
In an ABO-LTF collection, each function has an extra input called branch. In the following, we denote by B the set of branches.
Definition 5 (all-but-one LTFs). A collection of ( , ℓ)-allbut-one lossy trapdoor functions ABO with branch set B consists of the following (PPT) algorithms:
(i) abo ← ABO.Sys(1 ): this is the system parameter generation algorithm. It takes as input a security parameter and outputs the system parameters abo .
(ii) ( abo , ) ← ABO.Gen( abo , * ): this is the key generation algorithm. It takes as input the system parameter abo and a branch * ∈ B and outputs an evaluation key abo and an inversion key abo .
(iii)
← ABO.Eval( abo , , ): this is the function evaluation algorithm. It takes as input the evaluation key abo , a branch ∈ B , and a preimage ∈ {0, 1} and outputs an image .
(iv) ← ABO.Inv( abo , , ): this is the inversion algorithm. It takes as input the inversion key abo , a branch ∈ B , and an image and outputs a preimage ∈ {0, 1} .
We require that ABO has the following properties.
Correctness. For all abo ← ABO.Sys(1 ), all * ∈ B , and all possible ( abo , abo ) ← ABO.Gen( abo , * ), if ̸ = * , then ABO.Inv( abo , , ABO.Eval( abo , , )) = holds for all ∈ {0, 1} .
Lossiness. If the above = * , then ABO.Eval( abo , * , ⋅) is of size at most 2 = 2 −ℓ . * is usually called lossy branch.
Hidden Lossy Branch. For any PPT adversary A that gives the system parameter abo ← ABO.Sys(1 ) and outputs two branches * 0 , * 1 ∈ B , the advantage
is negligible in , where
Definition 6 (tightly secure ABO-LTFs). We say that a collection of ABO-LTFs is tightly secure if for any PPT adversary A; the following indistinguishability advantage is negligible and independent of , the number of evaluation keys:
The above oracle O (⋅) ( = 0 or = 1) is defined as follows: for ∈ [ ], the adversary outputs the -th pair of branches ( 0 , 1 ) and is given an evaluation key , where ( , ) ← ABO.Gen( , ). Clearly, the hidden lossy branch property of ABO-LTFs is just the case that = 1.
Constructions of Tightly Secure PKE Schemes

Definitions for PKE
Definition 7 (public-key encryption). A public-key encryption scheme PKE with message space M consists of the following PPT algorithms.
pke ← PKE.Sys(1 ). This is the system parameter generation algorithm. It takes as input a security parameter 1 and outputs system parameters pke .
( pke , pke ) ← PKE.Gen( pke ). This is the key generation algorithm. It takes as input the system parameters pke and outputs a public key pke and a secret key pke .
← PKE.Enc( pke , ). This is the message encryption algorithm. It takes as input a public key pke and a message ∈ M and outputs a ciphertext .
/⊥ ← PKE.Dec( pke , ). This is the decryption algorithm. It takes as input the secret key pke and a ciphertext and outputs a message or a special symbol ⊥ (indicating that is an invalid ciphertext).
For correctness, we require that, for all pke ← PKE.Sys(1 ), all ( pke , pke ) ← PKE.Gen( pke ), and all ∈ M, it always has PKE.Dec( pke , PKE.Enc( pke , )) = .
Security. We recall the security definition of indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) in multiuser and multichallenge settings from [15, 16] . The following experiment is played between the challenger and an adversary A and is parameterized by integers , , ∈ N (i.e., the number of users, challenge ciphertexts/encryption queries, and decryption queries). Clearly, if there is only one-user and one-challenger ciphertext, i.e., = 1, = 1, the (1, 1, )-IND-CCA security in the above sense is exactly the classical definition of IND-CCA security [24] , and (1, 1)-IND-CPA security is exactly the classical definition of IND-CPA security (or semantic security) [25] . The generic reduction from [15] showed that if A ( pke , pke )-breaks the ( , , )-IND-CCA security, there exists A ( pke , pke ) that breaks the (1, 1, ) -IND-CCA security and pke ≈ pke , pke ≥ pke /( ⋅ ). Thus, the security reduction loses (at most) a factor of = ⋅ . A security reduction is called tight if the corresponding reduction loss is constant.
Experiment Exp
4.2.
CPA-Secure PKE Scheme. In this section, we propose a generic construction of PKE scheme from LTFs and show its IND-CPA security in the setting that has polynomial number of users and challenge ciphertexts. Our security proof shows that if the underlying LTFs are tightly secure, then so is the PKE scheme.
The CPA-secure PKE scheme with message space {0, 1} is given in Box 1. It applies the following components: Outline of Proof. The proof is very simple. First, by the indistinguishability of LTF, we replace all users' LTF injective evaluation keys with lossy evaluation keys. Now, in the challenge ciphertexts, each function works in lossy mode and thus reveals at most ( − ℓ ltf )-bit information of . Applying ℎ to , it can extract a random string, which will hide the information of the encrypted message.
Proof. We proceed in a sequence of games. Let A be a fixed adversary that breaks the IND-CPA security of the above PKE scheme in the multiuser setting. Assume that it makes at most encryption queries to each user's encryption oracles. Let win denote the event that A wins in Game . Game 1. This is the original IND-CPA experiment. Roughly speaking, the challenger runs pke ← PKE.Sys(1 ) only once. Then, it runs PKE.Gen( pke ) times to generate public/secret key pairs ( 1 , 1 ) , . . . , ( , ) and tosses a random coin ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary A takes these public keys as input and may make at most queries to each encryption oracle PKE.Enc( , ⋅). Every encryption query is of the form ( , 0 , 1 ), where ∈ [ ] and 0 and 1 are two equal length messages. The challenger responds with * = PKE.Enc( , ). Finally, the adversary outputs a bit as the guess of . We say that A wins the game if = . So, 
Game 2. This game is identical to Game 1 except that we replace all users' LTF injective keys with lossy keys. By the indistinguishability property of the LTF collection, it follows that
for some adversary D attacking LTF's indistinguishability. 
Recall that, in Game 3, each challenge message is perfectly hidden by the random string ; i.e., * = ⊕ ; it follows that
Taking all together, we get Theorem 10.
4.3.
CCA-Secure PKE Scheme. Next, we propose a generic construction of PKE scheme from LTFs and ABO-LTFs and show its CCA security in the setting that has polynomial number of users and one-challenge ciphertext. Our security proof shows that if the underlying LTFs and ABO-LTFs are tightly secure, then so is the PKE scheme. The CCA-secure PKE scheme with message space {0, 1} is given in Box 2. It applies the following components: Let fl ( ) ≤ 2 −2 be a negligible function in . We require that (1) the parameters in the above primitives satisfy the condition ≤ (ℓ ltf + ℓ abo − ) − 2 log(1/ ); (2) the branch set B contains the set of signature verification keys. Outline of Proof. The proof idea mainly follows [1] . First, by the all-but-one property, we replace each ABO lossy branch with the corresponding verification key of the challenge ciphertext. Since the underlying OTS is strongly unforgeable, all branches in decryption queries would be distinct with the corresponding lossy branch. Thus, all ABO functions in the decryption queries are injective. By this observation, we can replace the decryption key with the ABO inversion key. Next, by the indistinguishability of LTFs, we replace all users' LTF injective keys with lossy keys. Now, in the challenge ciphertexts, each function works in lossy mode and reveals at most ( − ℓ ltf ) + ( − ℓ abo ) bits information of . So, the application of ℎ guarantees that the ciphertexts of 0 and 1 are indistinguishable.
Proof. We proceed in a sequence of games. Let A be a fixed adversary that breaks the IND-CCA security of the PKE scheme in the multiuser setting. Assume that it makes at most one encryption query (resp., decryption query) to each user's encryption oracle (resp., decryption oracle). Let win denote the probability that A wins in Game . Game 2. This game is identical to Game 1 except that it rejects all decryption queries ( , ) in which the verification key V is the same as that of the corresponding challenge ciphertext ( , * ) for any ∈ [ ]. Recall that A is forbidden to ask for decryption query such that ( , ) = ( , * ). So, ̸ = * . Suppose that there exists some decryption query ( , ), in which V = V * . It must have that
. By the strong unforgeability of the underlying one-time signature, we have the following result:
for some adversary D 1 attacking the strong unforgeability of the underlying OTS in the multiuser setting.
The proof is as follows. The simulator asks the OTS challenger to generate the system parameter ots and onetime key pairs (V * , * ). The simulator will receive the OTS system parameter ots and verification keys V * . The simulator then generates the other system parameters of the PKE scheme, including ( ltf , abo ), and generates PKE key pairs ( * , * ) as in Game 1. The simulator sends the PKE system parameter pke = (s ltf , abo , ots ) and PKE public keys * to the adversary. As the simulator knows all users' decryption keys, it can answer the adversary's decryption queries as in Game 1. To answer encryption queries, the simulator tosses a random coin ∈ {0, 1} in advance. Given ( , 0 , 1 ), the simulator randomly chooses ← {0, 1} and ℎ * ← H and computes * 1 = LTF.Eval( ltf , ), * = ℎ * ( ) ⊕ , and * 2 = OTS.Eval( abo , V * , ). The simulator sends the message * 1 ‖ ℎ * ‖ * ‖ * 2 to the OTS challenger to obtain a signature * which is signed under the corresponding signing key * . The simulator sends the challenge ciphertext * = ( * 1 , ℎ * , * , * 2 , * , V * = V * ) to the adversary. Clearly, the view of the adversary in the above simulated environment is the same as that in Game 1. In Game 2, the simulator rejects to answer all decryption queries ( , = ( 1 , ℎ, , 2 , , V )) such that V = V * . If such decryption query is not rejected in Game 1, ( 1 ‖ ℎ ‖ ‖ 2 , ) must be a valid message-signature pair under the verification key V * . The simulator sends it to the OTS challenger as the output of the simulator. This completes the proof.
Game 3. This game is identical to Game 2, except that each ABO function is chosen to have a lossy branch * = V * . That is, for user , it first generates an OTS key pair (V * , * ) ← OTS.Gen( ots ) and replaces ( abo , abo ) ← ABO.Gen( abo , 0 V ) with ( abo , abo ) ← ABO.Gen( abo , V * ). We show that the adversary's views in Game 2 and Game 3 are computationally indistinguishable, under the assumption of the hidden lossy branch properties of all ABO-LTF collections. Formally, we have
where D 2 is an adversary attacking the hidden lossy branch properties of the ABO-LTF collection.
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The proof is as follows: Given an ABO system parameter abo , the simulator first generates the remainder PKE system parameters of pke as in Game 2. It then generates OTS key pairs (V * , * ) and sends (0 V , V * ) to the ABO challenger to obtain ABO evaluation keys ( ) abo . Next, the simulator implements the key generation algorithm to generate the remainder public keys and secret keys as that in Game 2. Since the simulator knows all secret key * (i.e., the inversion keys ( ) ltf of LTF functions), it can answer the adversary's decryption queries and encryption queries as that in Game 2. Clearly, if ( ) abo is generated by ABO.Gen( abo , 0 V ), the simulated environment is exactly Game 2; otherwise it is exactly Game 3. This completes the proof. abo to recover the image in the decryption query ( , ). Recall that, in each decryption query ( , = ( 1 , ℎ, , 2 , , V )), if the verification key V = V * , the ciphertext is rejected directly. So, we only need to recover the image of for the case that V ̸ = V * .
Since LTF.Eval(
abo , V , ⋅) are both injective, there is a unique such that
That is, Game 3 uses the LTF inversion key 
Game 5. This game is identical to Game 4 except that we replace all users' LTF injective evaluation keys with lossy evaluation keys. Assuming the indistinguishability of injective and lossy functions of LTFs, it has that
for some adversary D 3 attacking the indistinguishability of the LTF collections. The proof is as follows. Given the LTF system parameter ltf , the simulator generates the remainder PKE system parameters pke as in Game 4. It then asks the LTF challenger to generate evaluation keys ( ) ltf , which are wehther generated by the injective key generation algorithm LTF.IGen( ltf ) or by the lossy key generation algorithm LTF.
LGen( ltf ) depending on the LTF challenger's random coin. The simulator generates the remainder public keys for each user as in Game 4; i.e., it first generates OTS key pairs (V , ) ← OTS.Gen( ots ) and then generates ( 2 ) is at most 2 − (ℓ ltf +ℓ abo ). Since ≤ (ℓ ltf +ℓ abo − )−2 log(1/ ), by the property of the family of pairwise independent hash functions H, it has that ℎ * ( ) is statistically -close to uniform even given ( * 1 , * 2 ). Recall that there are at most challenge ciphertexts. Thus,
In Game 6, since all (in challenge ciphertexts) are uniformly distributed over {0, 1} , the adversary has no advantage in this game; i.e.,
Taking all together, Theorem 11 follows.
From One-Challenge Ciphertext to Multichallenge Ciphertexts.
As introduced in [15] , for multichallenge ciphertexts, a generic (hybrid) security reduction will suffer from a reduction loss . According to the above security proof, to achieve tight security, it is better to replace all injective branches with lossy branches simultaneously in Game 3. This requires that all the lossy branches are tightly indistinguishable from the injective branches. However, the ABO-LTFs only have one lossy branch, which is indistinguishable from the other (injective) branches. A good choice is to use all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions that have polynomial number of lossy branches. Though there are some constructions of ABM-LTFs, all of them either have loose security proof or rely on nonstandard assumptions. It is still an open problem to find efficient and tightly secure ABM-LTFs under reasonable assumptions, as pointed out in [11] .
Instantiations under DDH Assumption
The constructions come from Peikert and Waters DDH-based LTFs and ABO-LTFs [1] , and our main work is to prove its tightness in the multiuser setting. We first introduce some basic notations and results. be × ( + 1) matrix over G ×( +1) . We define the following:
is the outer product of and .
(
is component-wise multiplication of and .
Prior to describing the construction, we introduce the following lemma that is useful in our security proofs. 
where A is an algorithm distinguishing the DDH problem over G.
Proof. The proof goes through a sequence of games. In each game, B is given matrices A 1 , . . . , A ∈ G ×( +1) . In Game 0 , the distribution of (A 1 , . . . , A ) is the same as that of (E 1 , . . . , E ); i.e., A picks random vectors 1 , . . . , ∈ Z and 1 , . . . , ∈ Z × {1} and sets A = ⊗ for 1 ≤ ≤
. In Game , all A are sampled as that in Game −1 , except that the group elements in the first rows of A are with random elements of G. Clearly, in Game , (A 1 , . . . , A ) has the same distribution as that of (G 1 , . . . , G ). Next, we show that the distributions of (A 1 , . . . , A ) in any two successive games Game −1 and Game (1 ≤ ≤ ) are computationally indistinguishable under the DDH assumption.
Given a DDH challenge problem ( , , ) ∈ G 3 ,
A first involves algorithm R ddh ( , , ( , , ), 1) for times independently to obtain tuples ( , , ). Then, A runs algorithm R ddh ( , , ( , , ), 0) for times independently to obtain tuples ( , , , , ), where ∈ [ ]. Now, A chooses a random vector = ( ,1 , . . . , , ) ∈ Z and sets matrix A as the following form: 
Now, we discuss the distributions of A for two cases: (1) If ( , , ) ∈ G 3 is a DDH-tuple, by the property of algorithm R ddh , the tuples ( , , , , ) are also DDH-tuples, and thus A has the same distribution as that in
is not a DDH-tuple, it has that ̸ = mod and the tuples ( , , ) are randomly distributed over G 3 . Clearly, with probability at least (1 − 1/ ) ≥ 1 − / , all ̸ = ⋅ mod hold. By the property of algorithm R ddh , the tuples ( , , , , ) ( ∈ [ ]) are randomly distributed over G 3 . So, in this case, A is distributed as that in Game with probability of at least 1 − / . Therefore, for any 1 ≤ ≤ , we have that
The theorem follows directly from the above result. 
Tightly
Proof. We first show its correctness and lossiness and then prove its indistinguishability.
is an injective evaluation key, then, for any string = ( 1 , . . . , ) ∈ {0, 1} , it has that
So, = /( +1 ) = and the correctness follows. Lossiness. If E = ⊗ is a lossy evaluation key, then, for any string = ( 1 , . . . , ) ∈ {0, 1} , it has that ( 1 , . . . , , +1 ) = E
= (
1 ∑ =1 ( ) , . . . ,
So, for any fixed lossy evaluation key, the image of LTF.Eval( ltf , ⋅) is completely determined by +1 , which has only possible values. Therefore, the above collection of LTFs is ( − log )-lossy.
Indistinguishability. By Lemma 12, any number of lossy evaluation keys (E 1 , . . . , E ) is computationally indistinguishable from random matrices (G 1 , . . . , G ). If the diagonal elements of each matrix E multiply , the results are injective keys. A random matrix, whose diagonal elements multiply a fixed element , is still a random matrix. Thus, the injective keys are computationally indistinguishable from random matrices, and the computational distance is at most 2 ⋅ Adv 
Proof. We first show its correctness and lossiness, and then prove its indistinguishability.
Correctness. If ̸ = * , then E ⋅ ×( +1) = ( ⊗ )+( − * ) ×( +1) is an injective evaluation key. For any string = ( 1 , . . . , ) ∈ {0, 1} , it has that (E ⋅ ×( +1) ) = ( 1 , . . . , , +1 ) = (
So, = /( +1 ) = ( − * ) and the correctness follows.
Lossiness. If = * , then E⋅ ×( +1) = ⊗ is a lossy evaluation key, which is the same as the lossy evaluation key in previous LTFs. So, the lossiness is ( − log ).
Hidden Lossy Branch. As the discussion on LTFs, for any tuple of branches ( 1 , . . . , ), the evaluation keys 
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